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Abstract
The implementation of emissions reduction policies in Australia has experienced significant
volatility over the last decade and remains in doubt due to different attitudes towards such
policies by policy makers. One of the critical concerns of policy makers is that the costs of
these policies would adversely affect economic activity and result in larger economic
volatility. This paper investigates how business cycle fluctuations of the Australian economy,
arising from productivity shocks, would be affected under an abatement reduction subsidy
policy in which the regulator supports abatement efforts in each period. To answer this
question, a real business cycle (RBC) model is applied. The responses of economic and
environmental variables to unexpected productivity shocks are presented and compared. The
results indicate that the regulator should adjust the abatement subsidy to be pro-cycle, i.e.
increase during expansion and decrease during recessions.
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1. Introduction
The implementation of emissions control policies in Australia has experienced significant
volatility over the last decade as the result of policy makers’ different attitudes towards the
costs and benefits of such policies. The Australian emissions pricing system was introduced
under the Clean Energy Programme by the Australian government under the Prime
Ministership of Julia Gillard in 2011. The program included two phases: first, a fixed price,
or a carbon tax, period commenced from 1 July 2012 and was originally planned to continue
until 30 July 2015 when the second phase, with a variable price system under an emissions
trading scheme, would begin. However, under the Prime Ministership of Kevin Rudd it was
announced that this fixed price period would finish one year earlier, on 30 July 2014
(Australian Government, 2013). This program was further changed under the Prime
Ministership of Tony Abbott who abolished the carbon pricing system with effect from 1 July
2014 (Australian Government, 2014a). As an alternative the government introduced the
Emissions Reduction Fund program which came into effect on 13 December 2014 in which
the government funds emissions reduction activities including the improvement of energy
efficiency standards (Australian Government, 2014b). Such fluctuations are in contrast to
Stern (2006) who discusses that a successful emissions scheme requires that the society,
especially consumers and investors, believe that the policy will continue in the future,
particularly in regard to high-carbon goods and services.
To investigate the effects of the above mentioned policies on the Australian economy,
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have been broadly used (Asafu-Adjaye,
2004; Asafu-Adjaye and Mahadevan, 2013; Meng et al., 2013) and several sophisticate
models such as ORANI, GTEM and G-Cubed have been developed to illustrate widespread
interactions between economic agents. These models are all deterministic in nature ignoring
any environmental and economic uncertainty related to environmental policies. The choice of
environmental policy, however, depends on the size and source of uncertainty (Angelopoulos
et al., 2010). The literature in environmental economics also highlights the role of uncertainty
in environmental policy analysis. This literature, beginning with Weitzman (1974), shows
that under asymmetric information conditions when the regulator cannot observe the real
firm’s abatement costs, price-based (quantity-based) controls, such as a carbon tax (cap), will
be an advantage if the marginal cost curve is steeper (flatter) and the marginal benefit curve is
flatter (steeper). In order to add other types of uncertainties into environmental policy
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analysis, we can use a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model which
involves all sectors of the economy and is more compatible with economic theories. A great
advantage of DSGE models is that they are micro-founded models based on the optimization
behaviour of agents with different constraints, technology and equilibrium. DSGE models are
also compatible with including sources of uncertainty and to be solved for exogenous shocks.
In this paper, we study the transitions effects of abatement subsidy policy, which is similar to
the current Australia’s emissions reduction policy, under macroeconomic uncertainty
conditions. To this end we use a real business cycle (RBC) model to compare the dynamic
effects of three different emissions reduction policies when productivity shocks occur.
The literature on DSGE environmental analysis is still in a preliminary stage and mostly
focuses on RBC models showing how environmental policies respond to economic
fluctuations. These models were first introduced by Fischer and Springborn (2011) who apply
an RBC model with total factor productivity (TFP) shocks to provide a comparison between
an emissions tax, an emissions cap, and an intensity target. Another primary study in the
environmental DSGE literature was conducted by Heutel (2012) who developed an RBC
model with TFP shocks to show how emissions tax policies should be adjusted to business
cycles. Following these two contributions, a few other studies have applied DSGE models for
environmental policy analysis including Hassler and Krusell (2012), Angelopoulos et al.
(2013), Dissou and Karnizova (2012) andAnnicchiarico and Di Dio (2015). In this paper, we
follow the existing literature by analysing emissions reduction policies in an RBC
framework; however, we compare the behaviour of an abatement subsidy. We show that
with the presence of productivity shocks, the abatement subsidy policy would affect only the
level and not the volatility of business cycles. We also show that the subsidy should be
implemented to be pro-cyclical, i.e. increase during expansion and decrease during recession.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model used which is calibrated in
Section 3. The model is solved and the results are displayed and discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 provides conclusions and discusses the future research direction.

2. Model
In this paper we generally follow Heutel (2012) to obtain the structure of an environmental
RBC model. The focus of his research is a centralised economy in which the economy’s
3

agents’ optimisation problem is the same as the social planner’s problem and there is no
externality. He then extended his model to a decentralised economy to study the performance
of an emissions tax under asymmetric information regarding total factor productivity shocks.
In this paper we use a decentralised economy with an externality from pollution in which
polluters are not automatically concerned about the costs of pollution they produce. The
model consists of a representative producer and a representative consumer where production
yt generates emissions mt. We outline the main structure of the model in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and
2.3 and we then specify the emissions reduction policy in Section 2.4.
2.1. Environment
The emissions aggregate in the atmosphere can be shown by the pollution stock xt which
imposes negative effects on the economy in terms of damages d(xt). This damage function
represents the loss of potential output supply due to pollution which indicates the role of
damage as it slows down the production process. Thus, d(xt) is an increasing function that
takes a value between 0 and 1. The stock of pollution decays at the rate of 1-η which is the
share of pollution absorbed naturally by jungles and oceans. The stock of pollution is a
function of domestic emissions mt and emissions from the rest of the world mtrow :
xt  xt 1  mt  mtrow . Emissions arise from production equal to: mt  1  t h yt  in which h

shows the relationship of emissions with output for given technology, maintaining constant
abatement. 0≤ µt ≤1 is abatement or the fraction of emissions abated in period t which can be
done by shifting to environmental friendly technologies such as renewable energies and is
determined by g t   zt / yt . g(μt) is the marginal abatement cost which is proportional to
output. This implies that total abatement spending zt is equal to the marginal abatement cost
multiplied by total output: zt  g t  yt .
2.2. Production Sector
There is a representative agent who produces a commodity using capital from the last period
kt-1. Like many other emissions reduction policy analyses (Kelly, 2005; Schumacher and Zou,
2008; Heutel, 2012; Angelopoulos et al., 2013), labour is not included here for simplicity
since employment fluctuation is not the interest of this study. The production function is
yt  1  d  xt at f kt 1  in which at is total factor productivity (TFP) and is the main source

of economic fluctuations with an expected value of 1. at evolves according to a stationary,
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first order autoregressive process: ln at   ln at 1   t where ρ is the persistence parameter
and εt is an i.i.d. normal random variable, known as the innovation shock to the productivity,
with a mean of zero and standard deviation σ. This random variable can be occurs once each
period and can be observed by agents at the beginning of that period. Here, the externality of
pollution arises as the firm does not consider the effects of emissions it produces although it
receives damage from the stock of pollution. This assumption is plausible in a competitive
market in which there are many identical small firms, each chooses the optimal level of
abatement (and thus, emissions) while they receive damages from the aggregate of pollution
from domestic emissions and emissions from the rest of the world. In such a market the firm
is sufficiently small that it ignores the impact of emissions it produces on the entire stock of
pollution (and thus, on damages) and takes the stock of pollution as given when it chooses
abatement. The firm maximises profit by choosing the appropriate level of abatement and
capital. The profit function is determined by:  t  yt  rt kt 1  zt where πt is profit and rt is the
rate of return on capital.
2.3. Consumption Sector
It is assumed that the economy is inhabited by rational identical households who derive utility
from consumption of goods and services u(ct). The household can observe at at the beginning
of each period and expect future values of at+1 and thus, maximises expected total discounted
utility: Et t 0  t u ct  . The operator Et is the expectation of future values of at+1 at period t


and β is the discount factor. The household is the owner of the firm and receives the rate of
return on capital and profit πt, and chooses between consumption ct and investment it. The
stock of capital depreciates at the rate of δ: kt  1   kt 1  it and the budget constraint is:

 t  rt kt 1  ct  it .
2.4. Emissions Reduction Scenarios
In this section, we specify four scenarios including Business-as-usual (BAU), fixed emissions
tax, variable emissions tax and abatement subsidy. Under a BAU scenario the government
does not make any environmental policy. Thus, there is no price on emissions and the firm
can produce emissions at any desired level. Without any emissions policy the profit
maximising firm is not motivated to engage in abatement activity and, consequently, it does
not take into account the effects of emissions it produces. The firm sets the costs of
5

abatement equal to zero, i.e. zt=0, by refusing any abatement activities, i.e. μt=0. Optimising
the profit over capital, the marginal value product of capital is set equal to the rate of return:
rt  yt f ' kt  1  / f kt 1  . On the other hand, the consumer chooses between consumption and

investment by maximising expected discounted utility which results in the Euler equation

 u' ct   Et u' ct 1  rt 1  1     0 . The household’s optimisation behaviour results in the
same Euler equation under other scenarios as well. Using these equations we can display the
economy under a BAU scenario as:
rt  yt f ' kt  1  / f kt 1 

(1)

mt  h yt 

(2)

 t  rt kt 1  ct  it

(3)

 t  yt  rt kt 1

(4)

 u' ct   Et u' ct 1  rt 1  1     0

(5)

xt  xt 1  mt  mtrow

(6)

yt  1  d  xt at f ( kt 1 )

(7)

kt  1   kt 1  it

(8)

ln at   ln at 1   t

(9)

In an abatement subsidy regime, the regulator supports abatement by allocating the subsidy of
st to the firm for any abatement effort made in each period: µt is the percentage of emissions
abated in each period, holding output constant. We assume that the regulator is neutral as
they levy a lump-sum tax on consumers and allocates the revenues to subsidise the abatement
efforts. Thus, the resource constraints are:
 t  rt kt 1  st t  ct  it

(10)

 t  yt  rt kt 1  st  t

(11)

The subsidy motivates the firm to decrease emissions by decreasing production or making
abatement efforts since emissions is a function of output and abatement, equation (12). The
cost of abatement is shown by equation (13).
mt  1  t h yt 

(12)

zt  g t  yt

(13)

Under this policy the firm chooses the optimal level of abatement which maximises profit,
equation (10), subject to equations (7), (12) and (13) which results in g '  t  yt  st .
Maximising revenue with respect to capital also leads to the optimal level of capital in each
6

period as rt  yt f ' kt 1  / f kt 1  1  g t  . Observing the behaviour of households and firms
the regulator chooses the optimal path of subsidy {st} which maximises social welfare in
terms of total discounted expected utility:
max

st , k t , y t , xt




t 0

 t Eu ct 

(14)

subject to equations (5) to (13) and
g '  t  y t  st

(15)

rt  yt f ' kt 1  / f kt 1  1  g t 

(16)

We can write this optimisation problem in the Lagrangian equation below:

Lt  t 0  t Et u  yt  kt  (1   )kt 1  z st , yt   t {u  yt  kt  (1   )kt 1  z st , yt 


(17)

 u  yt 1  kt 1  (1   )kt  z st 1 , yt 1   r  yt 1 , kt   1   }
  t {xt  xt 1  mtrow  mst , yt }  t { yt  [1  d xt ] f kt 1 }

Optimising this Lagrangian with respect to abatement subsidy leads to:

 u ' ct  z 's ( st , yt )  t u" ct z 's ( st , yt )



(18)



 t 1 u" ct   z 's ( st , yt )  rt  1      t  m's ( st , yt )  0
In order to solve such a Ramsay model the regulator optimises social welfare over kt, yt and xt
as below:





 u ' ct   u ' ct  1     t 1  u" ct 1  1   





(19)

 t u" ct   u" ct 1  1    rt 1  1     u ' ct 1  rk' ( yt 1 , kt )





 t 1  u ' ct  rt 1  1     t 1 1  d  xt 1  at 1 f ' kt   0
u ' ct  1  z ' y ( st , yt )   t  u" ct z ' y ( st , yt ) t





 t 1 u" ct  1  z ' y ( st , yt )  rt  1     u ' ct  r ' y ( yt , kt 1 )   t  m' y ( st , yt )  0

 t   t 1  t at f kt 1 d ' ( xt )  0

(20)

(21)

Equations (5) to (16) and (18) to (20) represent the economy under the abatement subsidy
regime. These equations, plus those from BAU scenario, are calibrated in the next section.
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3. Calibration
In order to calibrate the model we first specify the general relationships of the model, such as
the utility function and production function. Like Heutel (2012), the current research utilizes
the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model (Nordhaus, 2008) to specify the
functions. However, it deviates from Heutel (2012) in calibrating one of the environmental
variables, emissions from the rest of the world. Calibrating his research to the US economy,
Heutel (2012) assumes that emissions from the rest of the world is 3 times greater than the
domestic emissions produced by the US. However, tying the emissions from the rest of the
world to domestic emissions at a constant rate under emissions pricing policies would not be
appropriate since it provides a channel to transfer the effects of domestic emissions reduction
policies to the rest of the world emissions. In other words, if a policy affects domestic
emissions its effect would transfer to the emissions produced by the rest of the world, which
is not necessarily true. To avoid this we calculate the rest of the world emissions under a
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario and will keep it constant under the abatement subsidy
policy. This assumption is consistent with the aim of this study, which is to analyse the
performance of emissions reduction policies on Australia and not on the world economy. We
collect the global and Australian carbon dioxide emissions data from the Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC) over the period 1950-2010 (CDIAC, 2013). The data
reveals that emissions from the rest of the world are about 30 times greater than that of
Australia’s. Therefore, the rest of the world’s emissions are set at 30 times the steady state
value of domestic emissions m under a BAU scenario: m where ϑ is equal to 30.
After specifying the functions the model is parameterised to the Australian economy. To
parameterise our RBC model we use Australian RBC literature, such as Rees (2013), GomezGonzalez and Rees (2013), Jaaskela and Nimark (2011). The coefficient of output over
emissions is not available in the literature and we estimate it using Australian databases
including the Australian National Accounts (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014) and
Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts (Australian Government, 2014c). We also use the
Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) model to calibrate abatement
cost and damage functions. In the latest model, RICE (2010), 198 countries of the global
economy are divided into 12 regions in which Australia is in the Other High Income (OHI)
group. Thus, we use the parameters of the OHI group.
The consumption sector is calibrated first. Each period of time is set equal to a quarter. We
use Jaaskela and Nimark (2011), Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013) and Rees (2013) to
8

calibrate the utility discount factor β, i.e. the rate at which the consumer discounts the utility
gained from future consumption. They all estimated β to be equal to 0.99. The capital
depreciation rate δ is set equal to 0.02 (Rees, 2013). The consumer utility function is

u ct  

c 1
where ζ represents the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion and is set
1

to 1.661 based on Hodge et al. (2008).
To calibrate g(μt) we use the RICE model. Nordhaus (2010) assumes that g(μt) is highly
convex and the marginal costs of emissions abatement rises more than linearly with the
abatement rate. He specifies g t   1t 2 where θ2 = 2.8 and θ1 is a function of time with an
initial value of 0.07 for the OHI countries which decreases by 5 percent each decade to be
0.029 in 50 years. Such a little change in θ1 makes us able to assume that it is constant at its
initial value since incorporating changes in backstop technologies is not the aim of this paper.
For calibrating η, which represents the persistence of pollution in the atmosphere, we follow
Heutel (2012), who uses the Reilly and Anderson (1992) estimation of the half-life of
atmospheric carbon dioxide which is 83 years and is equivalent to 0.9979 quarterly. We can
specify the relationship between output and emissions h(yt) as h yt   yt1 . We estimate 1-γ
as the regression coefficient of the log of emissions on the log of output. To find this
coefficient we collect the seasonally adjusted quarterly data of emissions for Australia from
September 2001 to December 2013 from Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts
(Australian Government, 2014c) as well as the seasonally adjusted quarterly data on
Australian GDP for September 2001-December 2013 from the Australian National Accounts
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014). We estimated the coefficient, 1-γ, to be equal to
0.0975. The regression results are presented in Appendix A.1.
We set the damage function d(xt) to a linear quadratic function: d xt   d0  d1 xt  d2 xt2 . This
function is calibrated using the DICE and RICE models and leads us to obtain d0=-0.0011,
d1=-5.6629*10-6 and d2=1.2261*10-8. The calibration of the damage function is explaineed in
detail in Appendix A.2. The production function is calibrated to f k   k  where 0<α<1
shows the output elasticity of capital. Calibrating to Rees (2013) and Gomez-Gonzalez and
Rees (2013) α equals 0.33. Finally, we use Rees (2013) to calibrate the persistence of TFP
shocks,  , to be 0.98 while  t is a normally distributed IID shock with a mean of 0 and
standard deviation, σ, of 0.0069. Table 1 summarises all the parameters explained above.
1

This can be interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and is equal to 1.66.
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Table 1: Summary of the model parameters
Parameter
α

Value
0.33

Description
Output elasticity of capital

Source
Rees (2013), Gomez-Gonzalez and
Rees (2013)

ζ
β

1.66
0.99

Risk aversion coefficient
Discount factor

Hodge et al. (2008)
Jaaskela and Nimark (2011),
Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013),
Rees (2013)

δ

0.02

Capital depreciation rate

Rees (2013)

ρ

0.98

Autocorrelation parameter
of the productivity shock

Rees (2013)

σ

0.007

Standard deviation of  t

Rees (2013)

η

0.9979

Autocorrelation parameter
of the pollution equation

Heutel (2012)

d0

-0.0011

Intercept of damage
function

Estimated by the authors for
Australia from the Nordhaus (2010)
model

d1

-5.6629e-10 Linear coefficient of
damage function

Estimated by the authors for
Australia from the Nordhaus (2010)
model

d2

1.2261e-8

Quadratic coefficient of the
damage function

Estimated by the authors for
Australia from the Nordhaus (2010)
model

θ1

0.07

Abatement cost function
coefficient

Nordhaus (2010)

θ2

2.8

Abatement cost function
exponential coefficient

Nordhaus (2010)

1-γ

0.0975

Emissions elasticity of
output

Estimated by the authors from the
Australian emissions and GDP data
over the period Q2, 2001- Q4, 2013

Source: compiled by the authors.
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We substitute these equations and parameters into the model described in Section 2 to obtain
the numerical results in the next section.

4. Simulation Result
The model does not have an analytical solution, thus we present the numerical solution here.
We start with the steady state solutions where at is equal to the expected value of 1. The BAU
results are used as a benchmark case to compare with the effects of abatement subsidy policy.
The steady state of a variable b is the value that does not change over time, i.e. bt = bt+1. A
stability test has also been conducted to assure that the dynamics of the model is stable.Table
2 shows the steady state levels of the economic and environmental variables when TFP is
equal to one. The table also represents the percentage changes of variables under an
abatement subsidy policy relative to the BAU. The simulation results indicate that an
abatement subsidy policy can lead to emissions reductions of 6.45 percent under the subsidy
policy. This indicates that the subsidy policy can provide motivations for a producer to
undertake emissions abatement but this outcome comes at an economic cost. The steady state
outcomes reveal that under the subsidy policy capital has a reduction of 4.68 relative to the
BAU scenario percent under the abatement subsidy policy. The drop in capital, as an input, in
the subsidy policy results in a reduction in output which can be taken into account as GDP.
As the table shows, output decreases by 1.52 percent relative to the BAU scenario under the
subsidy policy.
The GDP reduction in the subsidy regime results in the lower income for households, and so
the lower consumption as it decreases to 0.60 percent lower than BAU compared. We are
also interested to find the welfare costs of the subsidy policy. To this end we follow the
DSGE literature (Stockman, 2001; Lucas, 2003; Fischer and Springborn, 2011; Dissou and
Karnizova, 2012; Annicchiarico and Di Dio, 2015) by calculating welfare costs as the
percentage of the reduction in consumption which is needed under a policy to make the
consumer indifferent between a BAU scenario and the policy scenario. This definition is
similar to the percentage change in consumption from the steady state value here since utility
is only a function of consumption. This leads us to obtain the welfare costs of 0.60 percent in
the abatement subsidy policy.

11

Table 2: Steady-State Levels with TFP Equal to 1
Variable

BAU

Emissions Reduction
Subsidy
(% change from
BAU)

Emissions (m)

1.1075

1.0361
(-6.45%)

Abatement (μ)

0

0.0625

Output (y)

2.8335

2.7904
(-1.52%)

Capital (k)

32.0936

30.5901
(-4.68%)

Consumption (c)

2.1917

2.1785
(-0.60%)

Welfare Cost

0

0.60%

Source: Authors’ calculations.
The above results represent the economy when TFP is equal to 1 and no shock occurs. In
order to obtain a solution in the presence of TFP shocks, we log-linearize the model around
the steady state values. The log-linearized model will be a good approximation of the original
model which facilitates showing small fluctuations around steady state caused by a shock. To
solve the log-linearized model we use the Anderson-Moore Algorithm (AMA)2 which is a
method for solving complex problems including perfect-foresight models and for asymptotic
constraints on non-linear models, which contain the main features of the model used in the
current study. Then the model is coded to Matlab. The solution results can be shown
graphically via two approaches: first, impulse response functions (IRFs) which are the
response path of the economic and environmental variables over a period of time when a TFP
2

AMA was developed at the Federal Reserve Board by Anderson and Moore (1985) and evaluated by Anderson
(2008) and Anderson (2010) and is verified as an accurate, fast available method.
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shock occurs in the first period; second, via simulating business cycles in the economy by
introducing a series of TFP shocks over a period of time and analysing the responses of
variables to those shocks. We present both approaches here.
Figure 1 displays the response path of four economic variables including TFP, capital, output
and consumption to a one-time, transitory shock to TFP under the abatement policy. The
shock occurs exogenously in period one at the size of one standard deviation of the
innovation, 0.0069, and decays at the rate of 0.98. As shown by the figure such a positive
shock results in a positive deviation of economic variables from their steady state values. The
path of TFP is exogenous since the innovation shock occurs exogenously. The simulation is
run for 200 periods, equal to 50 years. The result shows that the responses of economic
variables to a one period shock are pro-cyclical, i.e. follow the same direction of the shock.
The shock occurs in the first period and increases the productivity of capital which results in
higher output at the same level of input. Thus, the peak of output happens in the same period
of TFP, i.e. the first period. The increase of productivity of capital raises the firm’s demand
for capital. However, the peak of capital does not occur at the first period since TFP is a flow
variable while capital is stock and, thus, it takes more time, about 45 periods, equal to 11
years, to reach its peak. Consumption is highly affected by output, capital and abatement
costs: ct  yt  kt  1   kt 1  zt . As shown by the figure a positive TFP shock leads to an
increase in consumption which highlights the key role of income in consumption: an increase
in income will increase consumption regardless of the direction of changes in investment and
abatement costs. The dynamic of the consumption response, however, is affected by the path
of capital and it does not peak in the first period, but by around period 30 equivalent to year
7.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Economic Variables to a TFP Shock under an Abatement Subsidy Scenario
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses of Environmental Variables to a TFP Shock under an
Abatement Subsidy Scenario

The effects of a positive TFP shock on environmental variables are also presented here, in
Figure 2. The figure displays the response path of abatement, emissions, abatement costs,
variable emissions tax rate and subsidy rate when the same TFP shock occurs. As the figure
shows, the impulse response function of abatement is pro-cyclical under the subsidy system,
i.e. follows the same direction of the shock. This is due to the fact that under a subsidy
scenario the firm’s choice of abatement is affected by not output as well as the subsidy rate.
The first relationship, i.e. with output is affected by the sign of γ, θ1 and θ2. As explained in
Section 3, 1-γ represents the emissions elasticity of output and, thus, it is strongly positive,
calculated as 0.0975. Also, θ1 and θ2 determine the relationship between abatement and
abatement cost which are positive, and calibrated to be 0.007 and 2.8 respectively. These
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positive parameters result in a negative relationship between abatement and output which
means that a positive TFP shock which increases output leads to a decrease in abatement.
To investigate how the subsidy would be affected by a shock the IRF of subsidy is simulated
and displayed in Figure 2. As shown by the figure the response path of subsidy is procyclical. Also, since the subsidy is a function of current and expected future consumptions, it
follows the consumption path and peaks in period 30, year 7. Therefore, an increase in TFP
leads to an increase in output and subsidy. The subsidy increase motivates the firm to
decrease emissions by increasing abatement while the increase in productivity, and
consequently output, signals the firm to allocate resources to production rather than
abatement. Thus, analytically, the change in abatement is ambiguous but the simulation result
is remarkable: the output stimulus is more significant as soon as the shock occurs and the
abatement decreases. As time passes, however, the motivation of subsidy dominates and
abatement increases to a positive deviation from steady state and peaks in period 60, year 15.
The response paths of abatement costs the positive shock will simulate the subsidy to increase
and the higher subsidy rate motivates the firm to increase the subsidy revenue by reducing
emissions which can be done via increasing abatement at the same level of output, equation
(12). Also, the abatement response path follows the subsidy path peaks in period 30, year 7.
The simulation results also show that emissions increase when a positive shock occurs
despite the changes in abatement. This finding points to the important role of output in
emissions which results in emissions to increase to more than 0.07 percent deviation from
steady state.
After having discussed the IRFs of variables, we now present real business cycles here in
which a series of exogenous shocks happen to TFP that produces business cycles, i.e. output
expansions and recessions. Figure 3 represents the simulation time paths of output to a series
of TFP shocks. The simulation results include an expansion from period 20 to 50 followed by
a recession from period 50 to 80. In this figure the levels are normalised to the BAU steady
state level of output in order to facilitate comparison. As the figure displays, making an
abatement subsidy policy affects the steady state level of output but not the path of its
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Figure 4. Again, the levels are normalised using the BAU steady state level of emissions. As
we expected from a one-period IRFs, the emissions path follows output under the abatement
scenario, i.e. emissions increase during expansion and decrease during recession. Also, the
abatement policy results in lower levels of emissions than the BAU. These findings highly
depend on the subsidy rate fluctuations as the government should adjust it to be pro-cyclically
to business cycles: the subsidy rate increases during expansions and decreases during
recessions.
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Figure 3: Business Cycle Simulation of Output under Business-as-usual (BAU) Abatement
Subsidy (Subsidy) Scenarios when levels are normalised by BAU steady state level of output
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Figure 4: Business Cycle Simulation of Emissions under Business-as-usual (BAU) and
Abatement Subsidy (Sub) Scenarios when levels are normalised by BAU steady state level of
emissions
5. Conclusion
Australian emissions reduction policies have experienced several changes due to different
policy makers’ attitudes about the economic costs and environmental outcomes of such
policies. In this paper we simulated the economic and environmental effects of an abatement
subsidy policies which is the current policy implemented in Australia. The results showed
that such a policy results in an emissions reduction but at an output decrease and welfare cost
compared with a BAU scenario. In a stochastic situation and in the presence of a TFP shock
an emissions subsidy can encourage polluters to move to cleaner technologies such as
renewable energies when a positive TFP shock occurs. The real business cycle results also
showed that implementing an abatement subsidy policy only affects the steady state level of
output and emissions not the path of its fluctuation. The policy implication of this finding is
that the regulator should set the subsidy to be pro-cyclical to business cycles: they increase
during expansion and decrease during recessions. Note that the abatement subsidy findings
are for the scenario specified here in which the firm receives a subsidy for its abatement
effort in each period and the policy is run for a long period, which may be different from the
Emissions Reduction Fund program which is planned to continue only for 5 years.
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In this paper, we explored how the Australian economy under an emissions reduction policy
would response to TFP shocks. As a small open economy Australian business cycles are
affected not only by domestic shocks such as that of TFP but also by foreign shocks. In future
work, we intend to tailor the model to the Australian economy even more by extending our
analysis to the performance of emissions reduction policies in the presence of foreign shocks.
Finally, we will conduct a sensitivity analysis to investigate the dependence of our findings to
parameter values. The sensitivity analysis is necessary here especially for environmental
parameters such as the damage function and abatement costs which still remain unknown and
a change in any of them could significantly change the results.
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Appendix
A.1. Estimation of Output in the Emission Equation
The emissions at each period mt  1  t h yt  is a function of output, h(yt), which is
specified as h yt   yt1 . In order to obtain the exponential coefficient 1-γ quarterly data for
Australia’s emissions and GDP are used here, from Australia’s National Greenhouse
Accounts (Australian Government, 2014c) and the Australian National Accounts (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 2014) respectively, for the period of September 2001-December 2013.
Using this data the exponential coefficient can be found by regressing the log of emissions on
the log of output. The regression result is presented in Table A.1. As shown in the table, the
coefficient, 1-γ, is equal to 0.0975.

Table A.1: Regression of Log CO2 Emissions on Log Output
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.8789
R Square
0.7725
Adjusted R
Square
0.7678
Standard
Error
0.0056
Observations
50
ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

Intercept
LOG(GDP)

1
48
49

SS
0.0051
0.0015
0.0066

Coefficients
1.5923
0.0975

Standard
Error
0.0416
0.0076

MS
0.0051
0.0000

F
163.0349

Significance
F
0.0000

t Stat
38.2942
12.7685

P-value
0.0000
0.0000

Lower 95%
1.5087
0.0821

Upper
95%
1.6759
0.1128

Lower
95%
1.5087
0.0821

Upper
95%
1.67592
0.11282

A.2. Damage Function Calibration
In order to calibrate the environmental damage function due to pollution, we follow Heutel
(2012) and the benefits from the Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy
(DICE) to specify the damage function. While the DICE model provides a large, complicated
environmental-economic model, we simplify its damage function to a quadratic function. To
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this end, we briefly explain the DICE model and then present the simplification process. The
DICE model represents the global economic and environmental aspects of climate change.
The model is extended to a regionally disaggregated version in RICE. In both the DICE and
RICE models the climate change damage function is specified in terms of output lost due to
global warming. In the DICE model, Nordhaus (2008) specifies three reservoirs for the
carbon cycle: carbon in the atmosphere MAT(t), in the upper oceans MUP(t) and in the deep
oceans MLO(t). Carbon can flow between these adjacent reservoirs. Nordhaus (2008) specifies
the relationships between these three reservoirs as follows:
M AT t   E t   11M AT t  1   21M UP t  1

(22)

M UP t   12 M AT t  1   22 M UP t  1  32 M LO t  1

(23)

M LO t    23 M UP t  1  33 M LO t  1

(24)

E(t) represents the emissions produced in period t and φij are the flow parameters between the
reservoirs. Then the relationship between the reservoirs, or the accumulation of carbon, and
climate change is specified. The accumulation of GHGs increases radiative forcing3 which
leads to the warming of the earth’s surface.

F t   log2 M AT t  / M AT 1750  FEX t 

(25)

F(t) represents the change in total radiative forcing of GHGs since 1750 (as the postindustrial period) from anthropogenic sources such as carbon dioxide. FEX(t) is the exogenous
forcing from other long-lived greenhouse gases. The forcing radiative warms the atmosphere,
which in turn warms the upper oceans layers and then, gradually, the deep oceans.
TAT t   TAT t  1  1 F t    2TAT t  1   3 TAT t  1  TLO t  1

(26)

TLO t   TLO t  1   4 TAT t  1  TLO t  1

(27)

TAT(t) and TLO(t) are respectively the mean surface temperature and the temperature of deep
oceans. Finally, the economic impact of climate change, or the damages Ω, arises from the
mean surface temperature.

 t    1TAT t    2TAT t 2

(28)

As Nordhaus (2008) explains this damage function is estimated for the temperature increase
in the range of 0-3°C and the damage function is not virtually existent for warming above
3°C as the evidence of such temperature raising is highly limited.

3

Radiative forcing represents the perturbation in the radiative energy of the climate system which results in
changes in the climate parameters and leads to a new equilibrium state of the climate system (IPCC, 1990; 1992;
1994).
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Equations (22) to (28) represent carbon dioxide contributions to global warming damage. We
summarise the above relationships by modelling the damage as a direct function of the stock
of pollution. To this end the DICE (2008) equations of radiative forcing, the atmospheric,
ocean temperatures and the damage, equations (25) to (28), are used to find the damages for
100 values of the pollution stock, ranging from 600 Giga tons of carbon (GtC) to 1200 GtC.
This helps us to find the damage function for the pollution stock in the atmosphere, or the
carbon mass, of 600-1200 GtC. In order to obtain the damage function for Australia in this
research, RICE (2010) is used to calibrate the damage coefficients where ψ1=0 and
ψ2=0.1564. Plotting such a damage function over the carbon mass of 600-1200 GtC leads to
obtaining the relationship between the damage function and the carbon mass as presented in
Figure A. 1. As the figure shows there is a quadratic relationship between the carbon mass
and output such as that given by d xt   d0  d1 xt  d2 xt2 . This leads us to obtain d0=-0.0011,
d1=-5.6629*10-6 and d2=1.2261*10-8. These parameters represent the fraction of output lost
due to a 1GtC increase in the stock of pollution which can be interpreted as the effects of
pollution on the Australian economy.
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Figure A. 1: The Economic Damages from the Stock of Pollution in Australia
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